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Abstract 
This research investigates the social and political circumstances of Pakistan during 1980s, when General 
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq exercised his power and controlled the government of Pakistan by military take-over till 
he breathed his last in an air crash near Bahawalpur. Mohammed Hanif, a journalist and newscaster of BBC 
London Urdu service has written an allegorical fiction named “A Case of Exploding Mangoes” in which he has 
narrated various instances of General Zia’s praetorianism. During the course of narration Mohammed Hanif, as 
an adept critic and seasoned analyst of global political scenario has employed the devices of black humour, irony 
and political satire in an allegorical way by making use of real and fictitious characters, well known to the 
Pakistani masses and International Community for their significant role in Pakistani armed forces and political 
government. Mohammed Hanif’s novel is a very valuable document which very aptly describes the reality of 
Pakistani politics, army’s role and its interference in public and civil politics. This novel also throws light on 
General Zia’s personality as the Chief of Army Staff and afterwards as the elected president, who remained a 
perfect example of a praetor throughout his reign of a third world country, named Pakistan. 
 
Introduction  
What is Praetorianism? 
  “The control of a society by force or fraud, especially when exercised through titular officials and by a 
powerful minority is called praetorianism.” 
In other words Praetorianism means an excessive or abusive political influence of the Armed   Forces in a 
country. 
Daniel R. Headrick, professor of History and Social Sciences at Roosevelt University, describes 
praetorianism as a type of militarism oriented to the interior life of a nation, often related to minor countries, that 
does not aspire to fight or win international wars, but instead to maintain its influence in the domestic political 
system, controlling decisions that could affect the interests of the military as a corporation, or supporting some 
particular political faction or party. 
  There are a large number of nations of the World where an individual, a group or an organization overpowers 
the whole nation with illegal usurpation of power. Pakistan is one of  the unique examples of  this phenomenon.  
Amos Perlmutter has declared Pakistan as a modern praetorian state. A praetorian state is such a state in 
which  the  authority  relationship between  the military  and  the political government  is based on a “ legal-
rational orientation”, but even then this relationship favours the development of the military as the sole ruler  and 
encourages its growth  as a ruling class”. Scholars have hotly debated the causes of such type of hegemonic 
circumstances on the part of the military elites. Mohammed Hanif, a Pakistani novelist and research scholar has 
made an attempt to further enhance this fund of knowledge about the military power and its balance in political 
order of a country where he had been himself an armed force’s officer but due to certain reasons, he quitted this 
career. He selected writing novels as his career and succeeded in it very much. In his comic novel “A Case of 
Exploding Mangoes” he has selected a very hotly debated era in the history of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq’s 
era for the purpose of suggesting the assumption given by Amos Perlmutter to prove the Pakistani state – A 
praetorian state where military rules in all the cases , though it be dictatorship or democratic government in the 
country. The significance of this assumption moves the research agenda forward and as a researcher I became 
keenly interested in researching this aspect of the novel in an unbiased and critical manner. 
 The most of the Pakistani generals and the analysts who are sympathetic towards this “reluctant 
professional army”, on the contrary, are of the view that army is  compelled to “clean up the mess” of corrupt 
and inefficient politicians,  If so, it is hard to make sense of the equally distressing instability and corruption 
engendered by all army-led governments. This research paper answers the question that the military’s political 
domination is the result of systemic international constraints and the structural weaknesses characterizing the 
domestic polity? 
   There is no doubt in the fact that the timing of military take-overs in Pakistan (1958, 1977, 1999) never 
matched to critical international crises and specially the two latter  cases,  followed  particularly  assertive  and  
powerful  Prime Ministers. In this case a “normativist” reading, emphasizing the military’s growing “self-
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confidence” towards civilians, is more convincing. 
This research surely has a point, but perceptions alone are not sufficient to explain the practices of 
political actors, even less complex processes such as a military coup. A dynamic assessment, looking at the 
colonial legacy and changing pattern of the military’s political autonomy on the one hand, and identifying the 
peculiar configuration of the military-state relationship that emerged from this on the other, might help to clarify 
the terms of the debate.         
The Socio-Genesis of the State, the  close  relationship  established with  the US  in  the  1950s, within  
the  framework of Cold War military alliances, played  its part  in sustaining  the military’s  ascent  to  power.  
Yet this external support acted in an ambiguous way: not only did various US administrations apply distinct 
policies towards Pakistan, but the State Department and the Pentagon also regularly differed on the stabilizing 
role played by the military in Pakistan. 
  The very “socio-genesis” of the Pakistani state, to use Norbert Elias’ notion, proved much more critical 
in shaping the state’s progressive militarization. This  includes,  firstly,  its colonial  shape,  something much 
more  lasting  than  the  term  “colonial legacy” suggests for “colonialism is not simply a matter of legacy but  of  
active,  immediate  and  constitutive  determinants” Pakistan initially comprised those areas of the British  Indian 
Empire.  
“You can blame our men in uniform for anything, but you can never blame them for  being 
imaginative.”(Hanif: 2008 p. 12) 
“There are armies that guard their nation’s borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting 
their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea.  The Pakistan Army does all 
three” states Stephen P.  Cohen. These multi-dimensional roles are actually intrinsic to the way the Pakistani 
state came into existence as an “insecurity state on the defensive against a real and present threat, with its 
survival at stake” , and this insecurity of the state determined the role of the armed forces of Pakistan and in this 
way the Generals became dictators and praetors in the true sense of the word. 
   This perceived threat primarily  concerns  India,  its  powerful  neighbour,  from  which  it  seceded in 
1947, and on the disputed territory of Kashmir over which war erupted the same year, followed by three further 
ones (in 1965, 1971,and 1999). The “Indian threat” has also shaped Pakistan military’s doctrine, that of 
“strategic depth” which got it embroiled for 28 years in wars in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, this “insecurity 
state” soon became a militarized state. The Pakistan military, a volunteer force, grew from an estimated 215,000 
men on independence to the world’s seventh largest armed forces, with about 620,000 personnel in 2007. In the 
same time, the defence budget jumped from 600 million Pakistani rupees to 276 billion in 2007 (4.5% of the 
country’s GDP and half of the country’s export revenue). With defence spending swallowing up about 70% of 
total public expenditure in 1947, and still more than 20% today, the military exerts undeniable financial pressure 
on Pakistan’s feeble economy. In addition to this, generals have directly ruled the country for more than 30 years 
since 1958 (The largest time period is the reign of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, almost 11 years). Whenever 
elected governments interfered too closely in its internal affairs and areas it regarded as its prerogative (defence, 
nuclear, and foreign policy) or tried to politicize the officers, the army took over and removed the elected Prime 
Minister (as it did in 1977 by overthrowing the political government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the most charismatic 
Elected Prime Minister and head of the most popular political party of the country_ pppp) and the Chief of the 
Army Staff (COAS) remained nonetheless the “kingmaker” and chief arbitrator between various contenders for 
political power. The militarization of the state goes well beyond the increased levels of labour and resources 
allocated to defence, even well beyond the  fact  that  it  is  the  army  which  wielded  state  power. 
Review of Literature  
There is abundance of literature on military, civil-military relations, and general politics in Pakistan. I 
have used the following typology in order to categorize different literature. Propagandists- who look at military 
as an instrument of nation building and a modernizing force, Conspiracy theorists- who view military conspiring 
with foreign powers especially the US to gain and consolidate its power at the expense of political forces, 
Instrumentalists- who see military from the prism of external forces, Elite bargain theorists-who tend to view 
political developments from the elite perspective and Structuralists- who explain military in the larger context of 
the Pakistan's state. 
General Fazl-e-Muqeem Khan (1960) Huntington (1968), Burki (1991) and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema 
(2002) view the military as a nation builder. Being the most modern institution, the military gets into politics. 
The incompetent political leadership compels otherwise a reluctant military to govern. This propagandist 
literature virtually regards military as a neutral political umpire with a natural desire to serve as protector of the 
state. It simply does not explain the causes which forces the military to intervene in politics (Cheema, 2002). 
The work of Ayesha Jalal (1991), Saeed Shafqat (1997), Tariq Ali (1970) and Husain Haqqani (2005) 
constitutes the second type which finds the military as highly exploitative in fulfilling its institutional and 
organizational interests. Jalal even argues that the Pakistan army aligned with Britain and then with the US in an 
attempt to underscore the national political forces (Jalal, 1991). 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN (Paper)2224-5766 ISSN (Online)2225-0484 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.19, 2014 
 
97 
Her narrative, however, is based on a linear-historical description of events that explains the inactivity 
of the civilian leadership. The civil bureaucracy is viewed as a rent seeking institution materially and politically 
benefiting through its alliance with Washington. The relative strength of political institutions is next to nothing 
as there is an underlying conspiracy to strengthen bureaucracy at the expense of social and political forces in 
Pakistan.  
Jalal has further elaborated her previous work with no significant analytical modifications. In her both 
accounts the author has treated bureaucracy particularly the military as a post- independence phenomenon. 
Similarly, Shafqat while taking military as a post-independence phenomenon develops 'military-dominant party 
hegemonic system' to discuss politics from Zulfiqar Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto (Ayesha, 1995). 
  He has treated the pre-1971 period as partially hegemonic which is arguable. In addition, the writer has 
only emphasized the political hegemony of the military thus ignoring socio-economic dimensions of the concept. 
The third type (Instrumentalists) comprises Stephen Cohen (2004 see also 1984). He, in his two books 
on Pakistan and its army, has shed light on the regimental and organizational aspects of Pakistan Army from the 
prism of the US interests. The author, however, has not touched the domestic factors in analyzing the civil-
military relations in the country. 
Maya Chadda narrates the politics in Pakistan from the' elitist mindset which is essentially marked as a 
supreme force capable of using even 'coercive' measures to democratize, integrate and 'consolidate' the state in 
Pakistan. One simply wonders did the elite i.e., civil-military bureaucracy, politicians, 'consolidated' the country 
in 1971? This approach is defective as it creates the myth of an elitist leadership riding over a monolithic 
nationalism. Moreover, it reduces or better ignores the role of the masses in shaping the political developments 
in the country. In addition, it implicitly encourages the armed forces to apply unnecessary violence in the name 
of national consolidation to fulfill their own institutional and organizational interests. 
The military's power is studied as a structural problem by Hamza Alavi (1988, 1990), Hassan Askari 
Rizvi (2000) and Mohammad Waseem (1994). Alavi’s theoretical work with respect to state and its dominant 
classes is doubtlessly monumental. 
According to him the state in his Marxian context is an ‘overdeveloped’ structure having strong 
capitalist links with the 'metropolitan bourgeoisie'. The 'landed-feudal' class along with the 'indigenous 
bourgeoisie' strives to collaborate with the civil bureaucracy to further their interests politically, economically 
and socially. 
             The thrust of Alavian thought is that the bureaucracy is central to the state structure in Pakistan whereby 
the state functions ‘autonomous’ of the dominant ‘classes’. In their   bid for political power the three ‘classes’ 
i.e. landed-feudal, indigenous bourgeoisie,   metropolitan bourgeoisie, engulfed by some political crisis resort to 
the bureaucracy and the 'charismatic' military for arbitration. 
Despite the significance of Alavi's work, the room for improvement is always there. For instance, the 
author is not clear about the concept of 'overdeveloped' state. How and why does he assume so? Is the state 
'overdeveloped' vis-a-vis the civil society? If yes, then the dominant landed-feudal and indigenous bourgeoisie 
classes are part of the society and they are developed at least functionally in enhancing their politico-economic 
interests. 
Another way to understand Alavi's thesis is by looking at the state's institutions. If we look at the state's 
elective institutions such as parliament, then sadly we find they have not established themselves even after 67 
years in Pakistan. The only developed state's institution, as we see later, is the civil-military bureaucracy which, 
it seems, Alavi in his Marxian 'peripheral capitalism' paradigm has equated with an 'overdeveloped state'. 
Similarly, Rizvi's work is mainly about the corporate interest of the officer cadre .Their personal interests are 
dubbed as national interests. Unfortunately, the author is more descriptive than analytical and takes military as a 
post- independence phenomenon (Alavi, 1988). 
On the other hand, Waseem has very convincingly transformative links of the colonial civil bureaucracy 
with that of Pakistan. The civil bureaucracy was well trained and disciplined in the art of administration and 
political under the British. Pakistan inherited a good share of this 'colonial legacy' which underscored the 
existence of political and social forces due to the structural nature of the colonial state. 
Analysis of the Text  
The very first thing which one is forced to come across is the changing socio-political scenario of global 
politics during those years as Mohammed Hanif has discussed at the very outset of his novel is a distance of 
understanding between the naïve and deep meanings of things being practiced by army and public in establishing 
the political insight. Zia-ul-Haq has been the most powerful person of the country, being a praetor, a dictator and 
the Chief of the Army Staff of the World’s seventh largest army. Mohammed Hanif has given a deep insight of 
the changes which were taking place in the history, specially the political set up of the country. Look at the lines 
from the novel.    
“But this afternoon, history is taking a long siesta, as it usually does between the end of one war and the 
beginning of another” (Hanif, 2008. P.2) 
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In this novel along with criticism on Zia’s policies in Pakistan Hanif has tried to highlight the global 
politics and its consequences on the third world countries, especially Pakistan, allegorically. Look at the 
following lines. Baby o says: 
   “I, the imperialist Eagle, swooped down on Obaid's Third World 
Dove; he fought back, and for the finale sat on my chest 
drawing blood from my neck with his cardboard beak”.( Hanif.2008, P. 17) 
The same third World Dove, Zia-ul-Haq, was drawing blood from the neck of his public on one hand 
and from the Afghani’s on the other. In this context so many conspiracy theories were being concocted about the 
military rule of the country and it was only a fantasy in the country that military rule will ever be over but the 
Divine power has destined it in some way else, as the aeroplane boarded by Zia met a tragic accident which 
proved fatal for him.      
 “I didn't even figure in the stories concocted to cover up the truth. Even the conspiracy theories which 
saw an unidentified flying object colliding with the presidential plane,” (Hanif, 2008 P.4) 
Another glaring example of the Praerorianism of the General is his attitude towards his opponents, who 
were punished by him for no mistake of their own, just because of the difference of opinion. As Baby o, the 
imaginary character of Mohammed Hanif describes his opinion about the crimes and their nature in the eyes of 
the praeter and his favourite team members.   
“There is poetry in committing a crime after you have served your sentence. I do not have much interest 
in poetry but punishment before a crime does have a certain sing-song quality to it. The guilty commit 
the crime, the innocent are punished. That's the world we live in”. (Hanif, 2008). P. 4)  
 Thus it has always been true in the country that the guilty commit the crime and the innocent are 
punished.  
These lines well interpret the political scene and the emergence of multiple realities in this part of the 
world. The people of Pakistan were in search of real freedom but it was not being materialized by them even 
after years of their so called freedom from the foreign rule. In spite of getting independence there was only a 
change of masters for the people of Pakistan. Actual politics was being exercised by two superpowers of the 
world, namely Russia and America and Zia was the blue-eyed boy of America as he was the head of the state, 
being engaged in war against Russia. At last he had to cover up all the hidden and secret activities by the 
exercise of his sheer undemocratic and unjust use of power, which destined him to blow up in strange 
circumstances.     
 “Unsurprised there will be no autopsies, the leads will run dry, investigations will be blocked, 
there will be cover-ups to cover cover-ups. Third World dictators are always blowing up in strange 
circumstances”. ( Hanif. 2008 p.3) 
Another mask on the face of General Zia was the mask of his religious bent of mind , being the 
Mullah in General’s uniform but actually he was a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”. Look at the lines from 
the novel: 
“The generals who had called Zia a mullah behind his back felt ashamed at having underestimated him: 
not only was he a mullah, he was a mullah whose understanding of religion didn't go beyond parroting 
what he had heard from the next mullah. A mullah without a beard ,  a mullah in a four-star general' s 
uniform, a mullah with the instincts of a corrupt tax inspector.” (Hanif, 2008. P. 32) 
The lines quoted above are a very vivid and simple narration of the political strategy of Zia as he used 
the name of Islam for the establishment and enhancement of his vested interests. Being a praetor, Zia was not the 
first ruler to have declared Islam and Pakistan as synonymous. Pakistan’s drift from official Islam to Islamism, 
as Saeed Shafqat has shown, was gradual. Unlike India where the state “consistently violated its professed 
(secular) ideology” Pakistan committed itself to an Islamic system, albeit a progressive one, during its gestation 
period. 
 In fact, from 1940 onward the Muslim leadership increasingly took on board religion and religious 
symbols projecting the future state of Pakistan as an Islamic state consistent with the views of Allama Iqbal as 
articulated in his magnum opus, Reconstruction. After Independence, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 
under pressure from the Majlis-i-Ahrar and Maulana Maududi-led Jamat-i- Islami, the parties that opposed the 
demand for Pakistan, passed the famous Objective Resolution in March 1949, which was a blend of Islamic and 
Western liberal democratic traditions. Before Zia, it was the government of General Yahya Khan which vied to 
exact through the LFO (1970) a commitment from the future parliament and parliamentarians (under the threat 
of a Presidential veto) to frame a constitution consistent with the ideology of Pakistan. It is another matter Yahya 
government did not survive to see its plan through. Bhutto gave a timeframe under the 1973 Constitution to 
Islamize the laws in Pakistan and took a few steps (prohibition, Friday as weekly holiday, ban on gambling and 
betting on horse racing) into that direction. It was during the anti-Bhutto agitation by the PNA that religion was 
brought once again to the centre-stage of national politics.  
A political assortment of centralists, Islamists and secularists, the PNA rechristened its otherwise 
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secular campaign against electoral malpractices as the Nizam-i- Mustafa Movement. Even the celebrated 
secularists in the PNA such as Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Wali Khan, and Asghar Khan countenanced this use 
of religion for political gain. The mill of Islamization was therefore around Zia’s neck. And he used it with 
consummate craftiness for the sake of legitimacy and longevity of his rule. He repeatedly harped on the theme 
that Pakistan could not survive without Islam, and that an Islamic system was the raison d’etre for the 
establishment of Pakistan. “There had been military coups before”, so observed Roedad Khan, “but now for the 
first time, a maulvi, a deeply religious person was the Head of the State, the Head of Government and the Army 
Chief – a frightening combination”. In Roedad Khan’s view, Zia was “determined to recreate the Islamic legal 
and social order which had originated in the tribal area more than a thousand years ago”. Unlike most westerners 
who thought Zia “wrapped himself in a cloak of religion”, Roedad’s impressions were shared by Lawrence 
Ziring who had no doubts about Zia’s sincerity in this connection. In this way Mohammed Hanif is no exception, 
who called Zia a Maulvi in General’s uniform. He was sure that Zia is a staunch believer in the Islamic 
constitution as is devised in the Holy Quran.  
The following lines well interpret the viewpoint of Mohammed Hanif about Zia’s belief in the Holy 
Verses of the Holy book. Actually Islamizaton of the country was only one of the many masks which he wore on 
his face to elongate his rule.  
“Between making a decision and implementing it, General Zia sometimes liked to seek divine 
opinion. And although changing into uniform before or after morning prayers wasn’t likely to affect the 
destiny of his one hundred and thirty million subjects,” (Hanif , 2008. P. 25)   
    According to the teachings of the Holy Quran he introduced zakat and ushr applicable to all Muslims sans the 
Shiites who “buoyed by the pride of Iranian Revolution” refused to pay zakat and opposed Islamization that the 
junta had set in motion in 1979, based on narrow Sunnite interpretation of Islamic theology and law. The 
government also set up a Federal Shariat Court, Sharia Faculty, and appointed a Majlis-i-Shura (consultative 
council). It issued Hadood Ordinance, although punishments awarded under it were set aside by the Shariat 
Court under public protests. Even then Zeenat’s story ( a blind woman who was raped by some unknown persons 
but was punished by the Dictator for committing adultery) is a solid proof of the authoritative behavior of the 
general.  
In Zia’s scheme of things, women were the ornament of home and their evidence was half as good as 
that of a man under the Law of Evidence. Women Action Forum, a body of urban-educated women protested 
against these laws and generated worldwide concern. To avert any possibility of court intervention, he muzzled 
the courts further by promulgating the Provisional Constitutional Order (1980, 1981) and retired the recalcitrant 
Supreme Court judges like Justice Durab Patel and F.G. Ibrahim. The junta also curtailed press freedom through 
censorship, selective distribution of government advertisements, print quota, and public lashing and 
imprisonment of defiant journalists. Zia spent eleven years and state resources, backed with the military might, 
to depoliticize Pakistan. It is another matter that the policies he adopted contributed to greater political 
controversies and polarization. He used education as a foil and as an instrument of state control. Diversity in 
curriculum was discouraged in Curzonian fashion with added emphasis on uniformity and Islamicity.  
 “ Can we get on with the agenda? We have just toppled a bloody elected government, how the hell are 
we going to run this country?” ( Hanif. 2008, P. 33) 
These lines well interpret the fact that Zia was worried much about the government to be run by him after taking 
over it through a coup. He adopted all the possible measures to run the government efficiently and with an iron 
hand but despite these measures, Zia could not cope with the lingering question of legitimacy, as opposed to 
legality that the Apex Court had provided his rule. For the essentials of legitimacy, as emphasized by Mattei 
Dogan, based on the freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to assembly, truly democratic 
elections, open competition among the political parties, and judicial independence, were conspicuous by their 
absence during his eleven years of absolute power. The crisis of legitimacy pricked Zia as much as it had pricked 
Ayub Khan. Hence, he held a controversial presidential referendum in 1984. As expected, the polling wore a 
deserted look and the tired election staff stamped and stuffed the ballot papers. The question posed in the 
constitutionally deviant referendum was tricky: a yes vote to Islamization was to be translated a yes vote for Zia. 
Zia denied that he had asked for a vote on Islam but on his government’s services for Islam.  
The manner of referendum, low turnout (around ten to fifteen percent against the official tally of 62.15 
percent), and exaggerated results tarnished the presidency and its incumbent. The referendum became a subject 
of comics and the humorous Pir Pagaro, Zia’s political ally from Sind, attributed the supposedly high turnout to 
voting by ‘angels’. Regardless, Zia received messages of congratulation from within and outside of Pakistan and 
persevered in the power game with a manufactured mandate. Earlier, he had nominated a 287 member Majlis-i-
Shura as an Islamic substitute for parliament. Lacking power and comprising unelectable ulema, technocrats, 
retired military officers, members of the PNA and a few PPP turn-coats, Majlis-i-Shura could neither influence 
government policies nor did it lend legitimacy to its creator. However, it provided the regime the needed channel 
of networking with the country’s influentials, who felt indebted to their benefactor. Below the Shura, Zia 
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government, although reluctant to hold general elections, had already created elected local bodies (District 
Councils, Union Councils) to develop a new cadre of politicians, the ones who would be supportive of the Zia 
regime. With the objective of creating alternative political elites at the local level, he assigned them generous 
development funds which they used and misused so freely. Generally perceived as the reincarnation of 
discredited Basic Democracy System, the system was defended nevertheless by Zia, as he found more than 
enough members of general public who were eager to accept and work the local bodies.  
With powers relating to law and order, police, treasury, jail, and certain matters pertaining to 
administration vested in the Deputy Commissioner, General Zia knew the art of creating vested interests, hence, 
these pseudo representative bodies, which cushioned the dictatorship and harvested its benefits. Zia was candid 
enough to admit that “gaining power is easier than giving it up”. That is why he attached utmost importance to 
his first and real constituency, the army. To maintain a grip on the army, he developed and patronized a 
Jullundur lobby in it. In and outside the army barracks, he preached and encouraged venal propaganda against 
liberal or progressive politicians and blasted Western democracy calling it un-Islamic. He kept military 
contented with expansion and new weapons with greater opportunities for career advancement. 
 He skillfully reduced potential challenges from politically ambitious senior commanders through 
reassignment and retirement. He fixed a quota of 10 percent in the civil services for the released or retired 
officers in Grade 17 and 18, and 10 percent for Grade 19 and above. He reserved seats in universities and 
professional colleges for the soldiers’ sons and daughters, and offered the officers agricultural state lands and 
residential plots. He persuaded the conservative Gulf countries to seek the services of Pakistan army officers to 
train their own armies. He introduced the culture of duty-free Mercedes and limousines for the President, Prime 
Ministers, Governors and Chief Ministers. As Chancellor of the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, a liberal 
graduate school, he abolished its Senate, curtailed academic membership of its Syndicate, and appointed two 
unqualified brigadiers as its professors. He disallowed the arrest and prosecution of army personnel by the civil 
police and courts. Although Zia was not the first one to have lavished state bounty on the army, his real 
constituency, for personal political gain, it broke new records under his rule. 
Praetorianism, lacking popular support, tends to strengthen coercive arms of the State. Zia brought to 
the army the required modernization, courtesy of support from the conservative Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Indulging in blandishment of Saudi Arabia and declaring any attack on it as an attack on Pakistan, Zia won Saudi 
sympathy and finances to pay for the F-16 fighter jets. In 1981 and 1987, America promised Pakistan 3.2 billions 
and 4.2 billion dollars respectively as military and economic aid. The American money went a long way in 
strengthening the army and consolidating the Zia regime. Not all that money was judiciously used for the 
stipulated purpose. Behind his regular protestations of Islamic piety, he and his close companion, General Akhtar 
Abdur Rehman, a former ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) boss and CJCS (Chairman Joint Chief of Staff) 
managed to accumulate the most ill-gained wealth of all. The stories of corruption by the higher military 
bureaucracy surfaced in the international media as The Times published the “World’s Richest Generals” and 
“Leakage in the Arms Pipeline”. Nonetheless, Zia had the longest tenure of office in Pakistan, which was due 
less to good governance than to subtle moves like ad-hocism, western support, exploitation of religion, misuse of 
army, para-military and police, persecution of the opposition, disunity and opportunism of the politicians, and 
the Afghan War. As a President, Zia continued to extend his tenure as Army Chief and later appointed a Deputy 
Chief (General Mirza Aslam Beg) to oversee the routine matters. He had learnt from the fate of General Ayub 
Khan who, in his twilight, was abandoned by the Commander-in-Chief, Yahya Khan. Buying the American 
thesis that Pakistan had become a front-line State after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, he agreed to fight 
the proxy American War. The Americans were quite impressed with Zia’s commitment to fight Afghan War to 
the end, and Brzezinski, who had been the National Security Advisor in Carter Administration, praised him for 
that, if for no other reason, in his posthumous essay on Zia. 
As far as regional security and individual lives of the public and the military officials of the country are 
concerned the General and his team was very authoritative about the compliance of their orders in heart and 
spirit and explanation of this statement is evident from the following lines. In these lines a member of the Army 
ruling class is threatening his junior officer that some people who indulge in the activities counter to the will of 
the dictator die a death worse than dogs.  
“Some people insist on digging their own grave." 2nd OIC snatches the Quran from my hand and puts it 
back on the shelf (Hanif, 2008. P. 39) 
General Zia made Pakistan the arsenal of Afghan resistance, guerrilla training and a base of the largest 
CIA network. Colonel Shigri was the in-charge of the training camps and he died suddenly by hanging himself. 
The actual reason of whose death is even today unknown. Zia used his services for the vested interests of his 
own rule and then got rid of him. Seen in Washington and many Western capitals as fighting the West’s last 
battle against communism, America and the developed democracies put national interests before ideology while 
Carter and Regan administrations overlooked his worst human rights record. During the Afghan War 
sophisticated weapons and contrabands made their way into Pakistani bazaars, specifically into the troubled city 
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of Karachi, the agonizing legacy of Zia. He went on augmenting and exploiting political polarization in the 
country. To his comfort, political parties, other than the PPP, were not genuinely interested in elections.  
The corps commanders and Chiefs of the armed forces of Pakistan were afraid of their fate from the 
hands of the Dictator, who had called their meeting after the coupe of Bhutto’s government. They found their 
refuge only in following the instructions given by him. More over General Akhter Abul Rehman went a long 
way and admired general Zia in the following words:   
“I also want to thank our very professional commanders sitting around this table who carried out the 
coup on the orders of our Chief in such an orderly manner that not a single bullet had to be fired, not a 
single drop of blood had to be shed.”(Hanif. 2008, P. 33) 
         Zia chose to remain the uniformed President with enhanced presidential powers to make key 
appointments, dismiss the government, and dissolve the assemblies. Following the elections, he appointed the 
relatively unknown Muhammad Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister who then sired the official Muslim League. 
Having enjoyed absolute power and limelight for eight years, Zia was not ready for the oblivion due to the 
growing independence of the Prime Minister and the legislators. Junejo’s maiden speech on the floor of the 
National Assembly was an eye opener for the Generals attending the ritual. “Democracy and Martial Law 
cannot coexist”, so thundered Junejo, and continually urged the same until the Martial Law was lifted on 31 
December 1985.      
The dismissal of Junejo isolated Zia-ul-Haq. Little by little Junejo had earned public sympathy. His 
austerity measures, though symbolic, were well received in the public. For the first time extensive developmental 
works were undertaken in the rural areas by the revitalized local bodies. Junejo liberalized media and was 
generous towards the opposition. He declared all the political parties and their leaders as patriotic and invited 
them (including Benazir Bhutto) to a conference prior to signing the Geneva Accord, all against Zia’s expressed 
will. Therefore, when Zia struck the Junejo government, there was hardly a word of sympathy expressed in the 
defense of presidential order. It is another matter that the incumbent Chief Ministers including Nawaz Sharif of 
Punjab, then a blue-eyed boy of the establishment, abandoned Junejo for Zia at whose behest they tried to 
“hijack” the Muslim League creating in the end a breakaway pro-Zia Muslim League (Fida). With Zia in twilight 
zone, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared mandatory registration of political parties (under the Political 
Parties Act, 1962) with the Election Commission as unlawful.  
The Apex Court’s decision pre-empted Zia’s plan to hold party-based elections minus the PPP which 
had refused to seek registration with the Election Commission. Rather than showing any respect to the court’s 
decision, Zia tried to evade it by announcing party-less elections once again. That Zia had played his innings and 
was living on borrowed time was indicative of the Supreme Court’s decision and its newfound independence. 
With the Cold War over, the Americans, unlike Zia, were no longer keen in the Afghan imbroglio. In fact, 
Washington had begun to consider him a liability, distrusting his talk of an Islamic Confederation and his 
unswerving support for the fundamentalists among the Afghan mujahideen. Similarly, Zia was not on the same 
page with General Aslam Beg on important policy matters, particularly in relation to Afghanistan. And Zia’s 
corps commanders, many years his juniors, were not so close to the aging chief who now received only “filtered” 
reports. Having lived in the safe sanctuary of the Army House till his death, Zia tried to give this impression that 
he was still part and parcel of army life, but these were sure signs of a growing sense of insecurity. After the 
Ojheri Camp disaster, Zia did not spend a night away from the Army House. 
              His plane crash in August 1988, whether an act of sabotage or divine intervention, not only saved the 
isolated General from a possible retribution but also the nation from the hardened opponent of democracy. Zia’s 
death raised fresh hopes for a return to representative democracy in Pakistan. How he was afraid of his death in 
spite of being the most powerful person in the country, look at the lines given below: 
 “Those files lie. I am asking you, not General Akhtar. You are my shadow, you should know. You see 
everyone who comes to meet me; you know every nook and corner in this house. It's your job to protect 
me. As your Commander-in- Chief, I demand to know: who are you protecting me from? Who is trying 
to kill me?” (Hanif, 2008 . p. 56 ) 
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